Do Empirical Trade Findings Require a New Theory of Economic Growth

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Abstract

Empirical cross-country analysis of trade consistently shows a strong link between the openness of a country's trade policy and that country's economic growth. There are clear difficulties inherent in any such study in separating out the effect on growth of one particular factor, in this case isolating the influence of trade policy. Previous work in this area has also been hampered by lack of data, usually requiring averaging over decades, and uncertainty over how trade policy might be measured. This study makes use of a larger dataset allowing annual observations and makes improvements in the measurement of trade policy and the methodology of linking it to growth. The results are in line with previous work and confirm that trade openness has a strong link to income growth.

Since the first mathematical growth equations of Solow and Swan, technology has been seen as the ultimate driver of economic growth working through land, labour and capital. Subsequent work has focussed on how technology might arise, whether at a set rate, exogenous growth, or driven by deliberate investment, endogenous growth. However it isn't obvious how trade might influence either of these equation forms. Nordas et al (2006) set out four possible mechanisms by which trade might have a growth effect and conclude that the mechanism of technology spill-over gives the best explanation for dynamic gains from trade. This conclusion is not entirely satisfactory and neither is it well supported by empirical research.

This study suggests that it is necessary to re-examine the basis of growth theory to account for the effect of trade. The proposal is that the technology term in growth equations be replaced by a term which encompasses both technology and specialisation, and that it is through the specialisation element of this term that trade has its major influence on growth.

1.0 Introduction and Literature Review

The historical record suggests that trade has been a major factor in country development, with trading nations frequently achieving increased income levels. Economic theory, however, has been more equivocal about the benefits of trade. The early Mercantilists believed that countries should maximise their holdings of gold and so recommended barriers to imports and encouragement to exports. Most countries at that time followed this approach. Smith (1776), by contrast, made it clear that trade would be beneficial and that barriers to trade were undesirable. Ricardo (1817) showed how rich and poor countries alike could benefit from trade through the mechanism of specialisation according to Comparative Advantage. Led by Britain with the repeal of the Corn Laws, many European countries opened up to trade in the mid nineteenth century. However the support for trade opening was not unanimous and the USA took a different path after the US Civil War, based on the thinking of Hamilton. Hamilton's concept was that barriers to imports would force industrialisation and would thus be strategically beneficial for the development of the USA. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries the USA pursue a policy of tariff increases, in due course contributing to the great depression of the 1930's and a general reduction in world trade after other countries followed suit. After World War II the USA worked to reduce trade barriers, however the idea that import restrictions could be useful to drive strategic development has remained an alternative idea to trade based on Comparative Advantage and market outcomes. In particular development economists Prebisch and Singer advocated the use of trade barriers for developing countries in the 1960's and many developing countries still retain high trade barriers today.

Politicians in most countries have sought to reduce barriers to trade, but only if other countries would also do so. In effect politicians behave as if a barrier reduction by a specific country is beneficial to other countries whilst being damaging to the country that reduces the barrier, thinking that is essentially in line with the Mercantilism of 250 years ago. The examples of Hong Kong, Singapore, and latterly China, which reduced their barriers to imports unilaterally and grew rich are generally dismissed as atypical exceptions.

The effect of trade barriers on an economy can be in two distinct forms: one-off "static" effects and long term "dynamic" effects on growth. The theory of static welfare effects has been extensively developed from the original classical models of perfect competition to the incorporation of imperfect competition by Grossman, Helpman and others. The original classical models suggested that barriers to imports would always create a loss of welfare for the country which applied them. The imperfect competition models, by contrast, suggest that there may be situations where barriers to imports can be welfare enhancing. The imperfect competition models show value enhancement from barriers when a country is able to influence prices and also show that mutual reduction of barriers between countries is ideal in this situation (Grossman, 2016).

Dynamic growth effects from trade barriers have proved more difficult to incorporate into economic theory. Early mathematical growth modelling by Solow and Swan used equations with factors of land, labour and capital combined with technology. Initially technology was assumed to be created at a set rate exogenous from the functioning of the model. Romer introduced the idea that technology could

also be modelled and based on deliberate investment within the model or endogenous growth. Neither set of models, however, has an obvious way of incorporating dynamic gains from trade. Nordas et al (2006) examined this question and came up with four possible mechanisms by which trade might influence growth, these are shown in Figure 1.1. Nordas et al concluded that the only true growth mechanism from trade was technology spill-over. Technology spill-over would occur either from the acquisition of new technology when developing products for export or from the import of products embodying new technology.

Figure 1.1: Productivity Effects of Trade by Channel (Nordas et al, 2006)

	Channel of productivity gain	Level/Growth effect
1	Better resource allocation	Level
2	Deepening specialisation	Level
3	Higher returns to investment (investment/capita and/or R&D)	Level – long adjustment period
4	Technology spill-overs	Growth

Many empirical studies have looked for a link between trade and growth, Singh (2010) carried out a survey of 61 such studies and found that almost eighty percent of them found statistically significant evidence of a trade to growth link. Only one of the studies made the reverse finding of a positive link between trade barriers and growth (for the period 1875 to 1914) and further work by Schularick and Solomou (2011) has questioned this finding. The empirical studies also tend to show that the effect of trade on growth is considerable.

Singh (2010) also surveyed 44 microeconomic studies looking for evidence of technology, and hence productivity, gain to firms that traded. Of these studies 40 were focused on exporting and just 4 on importing, suggesting that Mercantilist thinking extends even into academic research. Of the exporting studies, 35 showed a link between exporting and productivity gain, however 19 showed evidence that firms with higher productivity were more likely to export, whilst only 16 indicated that exporting led to higher productivity. Of the importing studies all 4 showed productivity gains to firms which imported. Overall the findings on technology spill-over at the microeconomic level are not clear.

Whilst the overall conclusion might be that the macroeconomic studies offer comprehensive support for the existence of dynamic gains from trade, there are problems. The studies use different measures for trade openness, follow inconsistent methodologies and tend to have small sample sizes. Measuring trade policy has proved to be problematic in that countries use a variety of tariffs and other barriers like quotas and regulations. There is disagreement on how to handle measurement, in particular some economists recommend creating complex indices which take into account all types of barriers, whilst others recommend using simple direct measures. Methodologies vary, with cross-country analysis the most frequently used and lack of sufficient data leads to many studies being based on average figures

across several years and thus a small number of observations. As a consequence of these issues, the existing empirical literature on dynamic gains from trade cannot be said to be definitive.

2.0 Data

The trade policy data for this study comes from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), who produced a database of trade information going back to 1960. This database, Long Time Series TRAINS, is no longer available. Previous work on this data (Cadbury, 2016) used regressions in a modified gravity equation of different trade policy measures against trade value. This analysis showed that Effective Tariff, which is customs receipts divided by total imports, was the measure of trade policy which correlated best to changes in trade value, this result is shown in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Comparison of Performance of Trade Policy Measures (Cadbury, 2016)

Measure	Coefficient in equation with log real trade as dependent variable	t value	p value	R2	Observations	Number of Countries
Effective Tariff	-0.1366	-12.30	0.000 Sign ***	0.93	2685	133
Weighted Average Applied Manufactured Goods Tariff	-0.6519	-3.86	0.000 Sign ***	0.94	1421	151
MFN Tariff	-0.2004	-6.50	0.000 Sign ***	0.93	1877	157
Coverage of Non-Tariff Barriers	+0.3896	+1.76	0.079 Sing *	0.92	1962	154
Trade Restrictiveness Index	-0.5374	-4.69	0.000 Sign ***	0.91	1810	134
Standard Deviation of MFN Tariff	-0.2170	-2.50	0.013 Sign **	0.91	2002	157

Effective tariff also has more observations than UNCTAD's other trade policy variables. One key difference between Effective Tariff and the other measures is that Effective Tariff takes account of tariffs and subsidies on both imports and exports, it is thus the most complete numerical measure of trade policy available. An interesting finding from the above analysis is that UNCTAD's measure of coverage of non-tariff barriers does not perform well. This may be the result of the way UNCTAD calculated this measure, but it may also be that non-tariff barriers provide less of a restriction on trade than is generally

supposed to be the case, which would in turn cast doubt on the validity of complex indices which include both the effect of tariff and non-tariff barriers. UNCTAD's Effective tariff has been selected as the measure for use in this analysis, allowing a maximum of 2685 annual observations in a panel regression. This is likely to be an improvement on the data used in previous analyses which mostly relied on weighted average tariff measures averaged over several years.

3.0 Methodology

A consistent problem with analyses of growth drivers is isolating the exact relationship of interest from other factors. Two previous analyses illustrate this point and are summarised in Figure 3.1. A World Bank study (World Bank, 1987) classified countries according to their "outward orientation" and showed that the most outward oriented group outperformed the most inward oriented group on income growth by 5-6% per annum. This study used decade growth averages, the countries were classified qualitatively and there were just three countries in the most outward oriented group, making the average growth differences rather dubious. A later study by Wacziarg and Welch (2003) used a larger group of countries, but again had decade averages and grouped countries according to the Sachs and Warner open/closed classification. The Sachs and Warner classification defines four conditions which must be met for a country to be "open", some of which are more to do with macroeconomic management than trade itself.

Figure 3.1: Selected Trade Policy and Income Growth Studies

Study	Time	Number of	Openness	Scaling of	Dynamic Gains
	Periods	Observations	Measure	Measure	Identified
World	Decade	82	Trade/	Qualitative	5-6% Income Growth
Bank	Averages		Macro-		difference between
(1987)			economic		Strongly Outward
					Oriented and Strongly
					Inward Oriented
Wacziarg	Decade	249	Trade/	Open/ Closed	1.5% Income growth
and	Averages		Macro-		difference between
Welch			economic		open and closed
(2003)					

The larger dataset in this study makes it possible to use a panel with annual figures and the Effective Tariff measure is clearly focussed directly on trade. A further methodological enhancement is the use of a two-stage model to limit any effects of the tariff measure on growth through channels other than trade itself. This approach is designed to cope with the problem of linkage between policy measures. A trade policy is rarely implemented in isolation and typically trade liberalisation might occur at the same time as other macroeconomic liberalisation measures, thus a tariff measure may also act as a proxy for other policy measures. Limiting the effect of the tariff measure through the value of trade does not entirely eliminate this problem. It might still be the case that increased trade and growth were

influenced by other macroeconomic policies implemented simultaneously with trade policy, but it is very likely that tariff itself will be a primary driver of any effect on growth through trade.

A time variable is included in all analyses to ensure that time based trends do not cause spurious correlations. Independent variables are lagged by one year to help ensure that there is causality in the right direction and fixed effects are included, variables are converted into log form where possible (in the absence of negative values).

4.0 Results

At the most simplistic level there is a negative correlation between Effective Tariff and Income Growth in a fixed effects panel regression with a time trend, as shown in Table 4.1. The coefficient of Effective Tariff in this simple equation is significant at the 5% level and is negative, as would be expected.

Table 4.1: Result of regression of Income Growth and Effective Tariff

. xtreg incomegrowth time l.effectivetariff, fe								
Fixed-effects Group variable		ression		Number Number	of obs of groups	=	2012	
R-sq: within = 0.0232 between = 0.3649 overall = 0.0482						nin = nvg = nax =	20.3	
corr(u_i, Xb)	= 0.1962			F(2,269 Prob >		=	0 0000	
incomegrowth	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% C	onf.	Interval]	
time	.2136199	.0330927	6.46	0.000	.14873	03	.2785095	
effectivet~f L1.	085727	.0437324	-1.96	0.050	17147	94	.0000254	
_cons	-3.373642	1.397324	-2.41	0.016	-6.1135	75	6337093	
sigma_u sigma_e rho	4.7712811 12.812893 .12178074	(fraction	of varian	nce due t	o u_i)			
F test that all u_i=0: $F(139, 2699) = 1.27$ Prob > F = 0.0211								

When the variables are converted into log form, the change in log income is compared to the log of Effective Tariff (the percentage tariff is taken as a number, such that a 6% tariff is represented by 6, and 1 is added to this number such that the log of zero tariff is also zero). In log form the coefficient of Effective Tariff is no longer significant, as shown in column 2 in Table 4.2. Further growth explanatory variables are now added to the equation, first log of income level then savings/GDP ratio, Foreign Direct Investment/GDP ratio and Foreign Aid/GDP ratio. Log per Capita Income is highly significant and with a negative coefficient, supporting the existence of conditional convergence between countries. In the presence of per capita income the coefficient of Log Effective Tariff becomes significant and remains so

with the addition of further variables. Savings, FDI and aid all have significant positive coefficients in the combined equation. These results are shown in columns 2 to 5 of Table 4.2 and in full in Appendix 1.

Table 4.2: Dynamic Growth Equations

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Equation Type	Fixed Effects	Instrumented Fixed Effects				
Dependent	Change in	Change in	Change in	Change in	Change in Log	Change in Log
Variable	Log Income	Log Income	Log Income	Log Income	Income	Income
Log Effective	Coeff -0.008	Coeff -0.024	Coeff -0.023	Coeff -0.021	Coeff -0.022	
Tariff (1 year	P 0.220	P 0.001	P 0.001	P 0.003	P 0.010	
lag)	Z -1.23	Z -3.46	Z -3.27	Z -3.00	Z -2.58	
		Sig ***	Sig ***	Sig ***	Sig ***	
Log per		Coeff -0.085	Coeff -0.091	Coeff -0.096	Coeff -0.094	Coeff -0.096
Capita		P 0.000				
Income (1		Z -10.16	Z -10.35	Z -10.83	Z -8.60	Z -8.19
year lag)		Sig ***				
Savings/GDP			Coeff +3.391	Coeff +3.604	Coeff +3.333	Coeff +1.692
ratio (1 year			P 0.000	P 0.000	P 0.000	P 0.039
lag)			Z +7.72	Z +8.20	Z +6.79	Z +2.07
			Sig ***	Sig ***	Sig ***	Sig **
FDI/GDP				Coeff +0.011	Coeff +0.314	Coeff +0.083
Ratio (1 year				P 0.631	P 0.006	P 0.502
lag)				Z +0.48	Z +2.74	Z +0.67
					Sig ***	
Aid/GDP					Coeff +0.274	Coeff +0.180
Ratio (1 year					P 0.006	P 0.091
lag)					Z +2.74	Z +1.69
					Sig ***	Sig *
Log						Coeff +0.157
Trade/GDP						P 0.016
Ratio (1 year						Z +2.42
lag)						Sig **
Time Trend	Coeff +0.002	Coeff +0.003	Coeff +0.003	Coeff +0.003	Coeff +0.003	Coeff +0.002
	P 0.000	P 0.114				
	Z +5.80	Z +7.21	Z +6.64	Z +7.01	Z +5.34	Z +1.58
	Sig ***					
Instruments						Log Effective
						Tariff (2 year
						lag)
Observations	2841	2841	2697	2670	2004	1989
Number of	140	140	134	134	112	112
Countries						
R squared	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.03

Column 5 shows Effective Tariff having a negative coefficient which is significant at the 1% level, implying that Effective Tariff has a negative impact on income growth. A weakness of the analysis in column 5 is that tariffs might be decided as part of a range of macroeconomic policy decisions, thus level of tariff might be acting as a proxy for other macroeconomic policy decisions which might themselves affect income growth through channels other than trade. This equation therefore doesn't reliably isolate the tariff-growth link from other policy-growth effects. To narrow down the possible effects that are included in the equation a two-stage least squares approach is used with Effective Tariff now being entered as an instrument for the ratio of Trade to GDP, this two-stage equation is shown in column 6 of Table 4.2. This approach ensures that only policy effects that work through trade are taken into account. It is likely that tariff will be the main policy influencing trade and therefore this equation will largely isolate tariff effects from the impact of other macroeconomic policy decisions. To ensure the correct direction of causality Log Effective Tariff is lagged by a further year, such that the tariff level from two years ago influences the trade level from one year ago which influences the income growth up to the current year.

The equation shows a positive coefficient for Trade/GDP ratio that is significant at the 5% level, suggesting that trade policy is indeed having an influence on income growth and showing strong support for the existence of dynamic gains from trade. An important question is whether this finding is applicable to both developed and developing countries. To answer this point the Aid/GDP term was removed (since it is irrelevant to developed countries) and the sample split into two. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 4.3 and full results in Appendix 2. The results in Table 4.3 show very similar performance of the trade term in the two equations, which suggests that tariffs and trade have a similar effect on countries at different stages of development.

Table 4.3: Instrumented Equations by Country Level of Development

	1	2	3
Equation Type	Instrumented Fixed	Instrumented Fixed	Instrumented Fixed
	Effects	Effects	Effects
Dependent	Change in Log Income	Change in Log Income	Change in Log Income
Variable			
Sample	All Countries	Developed Countries Only	Developing Countries
			Only
Log per Capita	Coeff -0.102	Coeff -0.111	Coeff -0.104
Income (one	P 0.000	P 0.000	P 0.000
year lag)	Z -10.20	Z -5.20	Z -8.67
	Sig ***	Sig ***	Sig ***
Savings/GDP	Coeff +2.016	Coeff +3.627	Coeff +1.709
ratio (one year	P 0.003	P 0.014	P 0.024
lag)	Z +3.00	Z +2.46	Z +2.26
	Sig ***	Sig **	Sig **
FDI/GDP ratio	Coeff +0.011	Coeff -0.045	Coeff +0.066
(one year lag)	P 0.880	P 0.571	P 0.608
	Z +0.15	Z -0.57	Z +0.51
Log	Coeff +0.158	Coeff +0.228	Coeff +0.147
Trade/GDP	P 0.001	P 0.005	P 0.006
Ratio (one	Z +3.20	Z +2.78	Z +2.76
year lag)	Sig ***	Sig ***	Sig ***
Time Trend	Coeff +0.002	Coeff +0.002	Coeff +0.001
	P 0.035	P 0.108	P 0.124
	Z +2.11	Z +1.61	Z +1.54
	Sig **		
Instruments	Log Effective Tariff (two	Log Effective Tariff (two	Log Effective Tariff (two
	year lag)	year lag)	year lag)
Observations	2669	809	1750
Number of	134	35	87
Countries			
R squared	0.01	0.04	0.02

5.0 Discussion

The results from this study reinforce the findings of previous studies that there are strong dynamic gains from trade and that these are connected to trade policy. Column 1 of Table 4.2 showed a coefficient for Effective Tariff of -0.09, suggesting that a reduction in tariffs of 11% might increase income growth by 1%. A tariff level of 11% is typical for Sub-Saharan African countries, implying that removal of their tariffs might lead to a 1% gain in income growth and this finding is similar to the 1.5% income growth found by Wacziarg and Welch (2003) between open and closed economies in Figure 3.1. The empirical evidence seems to be consistent that tariffs have a major impact on growth rates.

As discussed in Section 2.0 there isn't a very satisfactory mechanism in existing growth theories to incorporate this impact of trade policy on growth. Nordas at al (2006) have proposed that the mechanism of technology spill-over from trade might be responsible (row 4 in Figure 1.1), but it seems unlikely that spill-overs alone could produce such a high impact on growth. A second problem with the spill-over approach is that significant technology spill-overs are only likely to occur within developing countries when trading with developed countries. The similar findings for developed and developing countries in Table 4.3 do not bear this out. It is also the case that the highest trade growth in recent years has been of intra-industry trade between developed countries, leading to faster growth of trade between OECD countries than between OECD countries and developing countries. It does not seem likely that technology spill-over can fully explain these observed trade developments and the results of empirical analysis.

A more likely explanation of the dynamic gains from trade would appear to be row 3 in Figure 1.1, specialisation. Smith and Ricardo's original arguments for trade were clearly based on the benefits of specialisation and there is a strong intuitive reason to suppose that trade will bring significantly increased specialisation, especially for smaller economies. This specialisation explanation for dynamic gains has the advantage that it would be applicable to any country trading with any other country. The rise of intra-industry trade can also therefore be taken into account and its implication for growth understood. The problem then is not that dynamic gains from trade cannot be explained, it is that there is no satisfactory way to incorporate specialisation benefits from trade into existing growth equations. There is therefore a need to alter the theory to suit the evidence.




Figure 5.1: Scatter Plot of Effective Tariff and Income

The modification necessary to growth theories to allow dynamic gains from trade is that specialisation and technology must be considered as the joint drivers of productivity and hence output, lack of either can restrict growth. Large economies that are well linked into the global trading system will tend to need technological advances to grow their incomes, whilst smaller, less well linked, economies will increase

their growth if they permit more trade, hence allowing greater specialisation. Figure 5.1 shows a scatter diagram of countries. Countries to the bottom right have high incomes together with good access to global markets for trade and will need technology improvements to increase growth, whilst countries in the top left of the plot have lower incomes with poorer access to global markets and what they need most is removal of their own tariff barriers to allow greater trade and hence specialisation.

6.0 Conclusion

This study made data, measurement and methodology improvements over previous empirical work:

- The use of a larger dataset, allowing annual analysis
- Identification of Effective Tariff as the best numerical measure of trade policy
- Use of two-stage least squares analysis to identify only trade policy to trade value to growth linkages

The results from this study confirm previous empirical findings:

- There are dynamic growth gains from liberalisation of trade policy
- These gains are large, in the order of 1% per annum income growth for developing countries

The literature review showed that it is difficult to fit these results into the mechanisms of current growth equations. This study concludes that the technology term in existing growth equations needs to be broadened to include specialisation, which would allow trade to be incorporated into growth equations.

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Appendix 1

. xtreg income	egrowth time,	fe				
Fixed-effects Group variable		Number o Number o	f obs = f groups =			
. betweer	= 0.0009 n = 0.0653 l = 0.0016			Obs per	group: min = avg = max =	40.3
corr(u_i, Xb)	= 0.0465			F(1,7151 Prob > F		_ :::::
incomegrowth	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
time _cons	.0327497 2.554772	.013111 .4195778	2.50 6.09	0.013 0.000	.0070483 1.732275	.0584511 3.377268
sigma_u sigma_e rho	3.0092096 14.778103 .03981286	(fraction o	of varian	nce due to	u_i)	
F test that a	ll u_i=0:	F(181, 7151)	= 1	L.40	Prob >	F = 0.0004
. xtreg income	egrowth time	1.effectiveta	uriff, fe	2		
Fixed-effects Group variable		ression		Number o Number o	f obs = f groups =	
Group variable R-sq: within between		ression		Number o		140 2 20.3
Group variable R-sq: within between	= 0.0232 n = 0.3649 l = 0.0482	ression		Number o	f groups = group: min = avg = max =	140 2 20.3 33 32.12
Group variable R-sq: within between overal	= 0.0232 n = 0.3649 l = 0.0482	std. Err.	t	Number o Obs per	f groups = group: min = avg = max =	140 2 20.3 33 32.12
Group variable R-sq: within between overal corr(u_i, Xb)	= 0.0232 1 = 0.3649 1 = 0.0482 = 0.1962		t 6.46	Number o Obs per F(2,2699 Prob > F	f groups = group: min = avg = max =	2 20.3 33 32.12 0.0000
R-sq: within between overal corr(u_i, Xb)	= 0.0232 n = 0.3649 l = 0.0482 = 0.1962	Std. Err.		Number o Obs per F(2,2699 Prob > F P> t	f groups = group: min = avg = max =	2 20.3 33 32.12 0.0000 Interval]
R-sq: within between overal corr(u_i, Xb) incomegrowth time effectivet~f	e: country = 0.0232 1 = 0.3649 1 = 0.0482 = 0.1962 Coef2136199	Std. Err. .0330927	6.46	Number o Obs per F(2,2699 Prob > F P> t 0.000	f groups = group: min = avg = max =) = [95% Conf1487303	140 2 20.3 33 32.12 0.0000 Interval] .2785095
Group variable R-sq: within between overal corr(u_i, xb) incomegrowth time effectivet~f L1.	= : country = 0.0232 n = 0.3649 1 = 0.0482 = 0.1962 Coef. .2136199 085727	Std. Err. .0330927 .0437324	6.46 -1.96 -2.41	Number o Obs per F(2,2699 Prob > F P> t 0.000 0.050 0.016	group: min = avg = max = (2) = [95% Conf14873031714794 -6.113575	140 20.3 33 32.12 0.0000 Interval] .2785095 .0000254

. $xtreg\ chlogpercapitaincome\ time\ l.logeffective tariff,\ fe$

Fixed-effects (within) regression	Number of obs	=	2841
Group variable: country	Number of groups	=	140
R-sq: within = 0.0236	Obs per group: min	=	2
between = 0.4116	avg		20.3
overall = 0.0485	max		33
corr(u_i, xb) = 0.2194	1 (2,2033)	= =	32.56 0.0000

chlogperca~e	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
time	.0022036	.0003799	5.80	0.000	.0014586	.0029486
logeffecti~f L1.	0084511	.0068924	-1.23	0.220	0219661	.0050639
_cons	0370441	.0239378	-1.55	0.122	0839823	.0098941
sigma_u sigma_e rho	.04351347 .12963303 .10126259	(fraction	of varia	nce due 1	to u_i)	

F test that all $u_i=0$: F(139, 2699) = 1.06 Prob > F = 0.2959

. xtreg chlogpercapitaincome time l.logeffectivetariff l.logpercapitaincome, fe $\,$

Fixed-effects (within) regression Group variable: country	Number of obs Number of groups	= =	2841 140
R-sq: within = 0.0595 between = 0.0000 overall = 0.0013	Obs per group: min avg max	=	20.3 33
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.9223	F(3,2698) Prob > F	= =	56.91 0.0000

chlogperca~e	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
time	.0027117	.0003763	7.21	0.000	.0019739	.0034496
logeffecti~f L1.	0239933	.0069366	-3.46	0.001	0375949	0103918
logpercapi~e L1.	0847365	.0083443	-10.16	0.000	1010984	0683746
_cons	.6626357	.0727965	9.10	0.000	.5198931	.8053782
sigma_u sigma_e rho	.13065228 .12724799 .51319774	9				

F test that all $u_i=0$: F(139, 2698) = 1.80 Prob > F = 0.0000

. xtreg chlogpercapitaincome time l.logeffectivetariff l.logpercapitaincome l.savin $> \mbox{gsgdp}$, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression Group variable: country	Number of obs Number of groups	=	2697 134
R-sq: within = 0.0756 between = 0.0069 overall = 0.0042		n = /g = ax =	20.1 33
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.9120	F(4,2559) Prob > F	= =	52.31 0.0000

chlogperca~e	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
time	.002501	.0003874	6.46	0.000	.0017413	.0032607
logeffecti~f L1.	0230972	.0070646	-3.27	0.001	03695	0092443
logpercapi∼e L1.	0905947	.0087563	-10.35	0.000	1077648	0734246
savingsgdp L1.	3.390983	.4391615	7.72	0.000	2.529835	4.252131
_cons	.6503686	.0755724	8.61	0.000	.5021793	.7985579
sigma_u sigma_e rho	.12043952 .12569506 .47865742	(fraction	of varia	nce due t	co u_i)	

F test that all $u_i=0$: F(133, 2559) = 1.90 Prob > F = 0.0000

. xtreg chlogpercapitaincome time l.logeffectivetariff l.logpercapitaincome l.savin > gsgdp l.fdigdp, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression Group variable: country	Number of obs = Number of groups =	2670 134
R-sq: within = 0.0830 between = 0.0016 overall = 0.0035	Obs per group: min = avg = max =	1 19.9 33
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.9183	F(5,2531) = Prob > F =	45.83 0.0000

chlogperca~e	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
time	.0027428	.0003914	7.01	0.000	.0019753	.0035103
logeffecti~f L1.	021174	.0070538	-3.00	0.003	0350058	0073422
logpercapi∼e L1.	0957422	.0088384	-10.83	0.000	1130735	0784109
savingsgdp L1.	3.6041	.4396083	8.20	0.000	2.742072	4.466129
fdigdp L1.	.0114565	.0238808	0.48	0.631	0353714	.0582844
_cons	.6765058	.0759576	8.91	0.000	.5275604	.8254512
sigma_u sigma_e rho	.13057271 .12494536 .5220126	(fraction	of varia	nce due 1	to u_i)	

F test that all $u_i=0$: F(133, 2531) = 2.04 Prob > F = 0.0000

. xtreg chlogpercapitaincome time 1.logeffectivetariff 1.logpercapitaincome 1.savin $> \mathsf{gsgdp}\ 1.\mathsf{fdigdp}\ 1.\mathsf{aidgdp}$, fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression Group variable: country	Number of obs = Number of groups =	2004 112
R-sq: within = 0.0972 between = 0.0006 overall = 0.0098	Obs per group: min = avg = max =	1 17.9 33
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.8645	F(6,1886) = Prob > F =	33.86 0.0000

chlogperca~e	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	<pre>Interval]</pre>
time	.0026046	.000488	5.34	0.000	.0016476	.0035616
logeffecti∼f L1.	0216544	.0084001	-2.58	0.010	0381288	00518
logpercapi∼e L1.	0944947	.0109875	-8.60	0.000	1160437	0729456
savingsgdp L1.	3.333205	.4912305	6.79	0.000	2.369793	4.296617
fdigdp L1.	.3140601	.1144239	2.74	0.006	.0896495	.5384708
aidgdp L1.	. 2735547	.0999072	2.74	0.006	.0776145	.469495
_cons	.6056158	.0934679	6.48	0.000	.4223043	.7889272
sigma_u sigma_e rho	.11908255 .13061339 .45391873	(fraction	of varian	nce due t	:o u_i)	
F test that all $u_i=0$: $F(111, 1886) = 1.91$ Prob > $F = 0.0000$						

$$(111, 1886) = 1.9$$

. xtivreg chlogpercapitaincome time 1.logpercapitaincome 1.savingsgdp 1.fdigdp l.ai > dgdp (1.logtradegdp=12.logeffectivetariff), fe

, agap (ogc.aacgap .logcccccca)	,		
Fixed-effects (within) IV regression Group variable: country	Humber of obs	= =	1989 112
R-sq: within = 0.1310 between = 0.0123 overall = 0.0260	Obs per group: min avg max	=	17.8 33
$corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.8402$	Wald chi2(6) Prob > chi2	=	279.43 0.0000

chlogperca~e	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
logtradegdp L1.	.1569437	.0649584	2.42	0.016	.0296275	. 2842599
time	.0015874	.0010035	1.58	0.114	0003794	.0035543
logpercapi∼e L1.	0956511	.0116852	-8.19	0.000	1185538	0727485
savingsgdp L1.	1.691711	.8177595	2.07	0.039	.0889316	3.29449
fdigdp L1.	.0833303	.1241889	0.67	0.502	1600754	.326736
aidgdp L1.	.1802987	.1067017	1.69	0.091	0288327	.3894301
_cons	.0249192	.258675	0.10	0.923	4820745	.5319128
sigma_u sigma_e rho	.12492628 .12913832 .48342596	(fraction (of variar	nce due 1	to u_i)	
F test that a	F(111,1871)) = 2	2.39	Prob > F	= 0.0000	

Instrumented: L.logtradegdp
Instruments: time L.logpercapitaincome L.savingsgdp L.fdigdp L.aidgdp
L2.logeffectivetariff

Appendix 2

. xtivreg chlogpercapitaincome time l.logpercapitaincome l.savingsgdp l.fdigdp (l.l > ogtradegdp=12.logeffectivetariff), fe

Fixed-effects (within) IV regression Group variable: country	Number of obs = Number of groups =	2669 134
R-sq: within = 0.1153 between = 0.0088 overall = 0.0090	Obs per group: min = avg = max =	19.9 33
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.9278	Wald chi2(5) = Prob > chi2 =	375.43 0.0000

chlogperca~e	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
logtradegdp L1.	.158055	.0493309	3.20	0.001	.0613681	.2547419
time	.0015538	.0007372	2.11	0.035	.0001088	.0029987
logpercapi∼e L1.	1017679	.0099754	-10.20	0.000	1213194	0822164
savingsgdp L1.	2.016247	.6714897	3.00	0.003	.7001517	3.332343
fdigdp L1.	.0108554	.072117	0.15	0.880	1304912	.1522021
_cons	.1401857	.2108857	0.66	0.506	2731427	.5535142
sigma_u sigma_e rho	.15817201 .12434276 .61805062	(fraction	of varia	nce due 1	to u_i)	
F test that a	all u_i=0:	F(133,2530)) =	2.82	Prob > F	= 0.0000

Instrumented:

L.logtradegdp time L.logpercapitaincome L.savingsgdp L.fdigdp L2.logeffectivetariff Instruments:

. xtivreg chlogpercapitaincome time l.logpercapitaincome l.savingsgdp l.fdigdp (l.l > ogtradegdp=l2.logeffectivetariff) if ddeveloped==1, fe

Fixed-effects (within) IV regression	Number of obs	=	809
Group variable: country	Number of groups		35
R-sq: within = 0.0560	Obs per group: min	=	3
between = 0.5602	avg		23.1
overall = 0.0441	max		33
$corr(u_i, xb) = -0.9586$	wald chi2(5) Prob > chi2	=	155.14 0.0000

chlogperca~e	Coef.	Std. Err.	Z	P> z	[95% Conf.	<pre>Interval]</pre>
logtradegdp L1.	. 2284635	.0822721	2.78	0.005	.0672131	.3897138
time	.0020399	.0012685	1.61	0.108	0004463	.0045262
logpercapi∼e L1.	1108644	.0213214	-5.20	0.000	1526536	0690752
savingsgdp L1.	3.627023	1.474611	2.46	0.014	.7368397	6.517207
fdigdp L1.	0450233	.0793772	-0.57	0.571	2005998	.1105531
_cons	.0791391	.4062136	0.19	0.846	717025	.8753031
sigma_u sigma_e rho	.15225121 .10864788 .66258593	(fraction	of varia	nce due	to u_i)	
F test that a	all u_i=0:	F(34,769)	= 1.8	85	Prob > F	= 0.0026

Instrumented:
Instruments: L.logtradegdp time L.logpercapitaincome L.savingsgdp L.fdigdp L2.logeffectivetariff

. xtivreg chlogpercapitaincome time l.logpercapitaincome l.savingsgdp l.fdigdp (l.l > ogtradegdp=12.logeffectivetariff) if ddeveloping==1, fe

Fixed-effects (within) IV regression Group variable: country	Humber of Obs	=	1750 87
R-sq: within = 0.1280 between = 0.0021 overall = 0.0246	Obs per group: min avg max	=	20.1 33
corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.8547	wald chi2(5) Prob > chi2	=	223.03 0.0000

chlogperca~e	Coef.	Std. Err.	Z	P> Z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
logtradegdp L1.	.147115	.0533829	2.76	0.006	.0424864	.2517435
time	.0012692	.0008261	1.54	0.124	00035	.0028883
logpercapi∼e L1.	1040358	.011999	-8.67	0.000	1275534	0805182
savingsgdp L1.	1.709211	.7572903	2.26	0.024	.224949	3.193472
fdigdp L1.	.0659636	.1287462	0.51	0.608	1863742	.3183015
_cons	.1381288	.2241609	0.62	0.538	3012184	.577476
sigma_u sigma_e rho	.12405481 .12882167 .48115615	(fraction	of variar	nce due t	to u_i)	
F test that all u_i=0:		F(86,1658) = 2.48			Prob > F	= 0.0000

Instrumented:

L.logtradegdp time L.logpercapitaincome L.savingsgdp L.fdigdp L2.logeffectivetariff Instruments: